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I OTES I
COMMONWEALTH v. TETLEY TEA CO.: THE MEANING
OF MANUFACTURING-A BASIS FOR EXEMPTION
FROM CORPORATE TAXATION
IN PENNSYLVANIA
In Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Co.1 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a company which takes loose tea and special
paper and produces tea bags by means of elaborate machinery is
not engaged in manufacturing. The company was therefore not
exemption from Pennsylallowed the benefit of the manufacturer's
2
vania's foreign franchise tax.*
Tetley Tea Co., a New York corporation authorized to manufacture in Pennsylvania, leased a plant in Pennsylvania for the purpose of blending tea, filling tea bags, and distributing and selling
its products. The company's operations consisted of buying the
tea in bulk, sifting and screening it to remove impurities, mixing
various tea leaves to achieve a distinctive blend and feeding the
blend into tea bag machinery. The machines contained special paper which was heat-sealed to form a bag. The bag was then filled
with a measured amount of tea. A string and tag were attached
and the tea bags were packaged for shipment.
In its franchise tax report, Tetley claimed the manufacturing
exemption. It was denied3 and the company appealed to the Cor1. 421 Pa. 614, 220 A.2d 832 (1966).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871(b) (Supp. 1965). The so-called "man-

ufacturing exemption" consists in excluding from the tax formula (1) the

portion of taxpayer's tangible property used actually and exclusively in
manufacturing; (2) wages paid to employees engaged in these manufacturing activities; (3) gross receipts "strictly incident to or appurtenant to"
the manufacturing activities.

3. The procedure involved in appeals from tax assessments is governed by the provisions of the Fiscal Code. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1-1867
(Supp. 1966). The company files its report and at the same time pays the

tax. The Department of Revenue then audits the report. This is the "settlement," which shows the amount the Commonwealth claims is due.
It is subject to the approval of the Auditor General and correction by the
Board of Finance and Revenue. A copy of the settlement is mailed to the
taxpayer. The taxpayer may petition the Department for a resettlement,
setting forth his objections. The Department has six months in which to
act on the petition and if the taxpayer is not satisfied with the Department's action, he may petition the Board of Finance and Revenue to review
such action. This petition must be disposed of within six months. There-

after the taxpayer may, within sixty days, appeal to the Commonwealth
Court. See generally 1 CCH PA. TAx REP.

89-212-282.
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monwealth Court. 4 The appeal was dismissed 5 and the supreme
court affirmed. 6 The Commonwealth's contention that Tetley was
not a manufacturer because it did not produce a "new and different" product was sustained. The court said:
Mere convenience, leading to a greater and wider appeal for a product, does not make the process by which that
convenience is7 achieved manufacturing within the purview
of the statute.
Several Pennsylvania tax statutes s provide for either the exemption or exclusion of manufacturers in order to create a favorable
climate in Pennsylvania for manufacturers and thus encourage the
development of industry. This purpose was expressed by the supreme court seventy-five years ago:
When the Act of 1885 [exempting manufacturers from
the capital stock tax] was passed, laws had been made in
adjoining states which gave encouragement to the establishment of factories by exempting them from certain forms
of taxation. The mischief to be remedied was the danger
that such legislation might lead to the removal of capital
and labor from this state to others, to the detriment of the
business and prosperity of our own. The remedy provided
was the removal of the tax [on capital stock] imposed by
the Act of 1879, so as to remove the inducement to leave the
state. It was . . . made applicable to the class which since
1836 it had been the policy of the state to encourage, viz.,
"manufacturing corporations" . . . that class of productive
industries which the legislature had sought to encourage as
a means of bringing and keeping within our borders capital
and labor to be employed in the development of our mineral
wealth, and in the production of the staples of commerce.9
Many Pennsylvania decisions involving these statutes are vital
4. This is the court of common pleas of Dauphin County which has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning taxes owing to the Commonwealth. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1104 (Supp. 1965).
5. Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Co., 84 Dauph. 312, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d
729 (C.P. 1966). The court held that although the company made a bag,
this was not sufficient to constitute manufacturing since the company began with and finished with tea.
6. Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Co., 421 Pa. 614, 220 A.2d 832 (1966).
7. Id. at 617, 220 A.2d at 612.
8. The "Tax Anything" Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6851 (Supp.
1965), forbids political subdivisions from taxing manufactured articles, or
any privilege or activity related to manufacturing. The Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia School District taxing acts contain specific exemptions for
manufacturing. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 582.1, 584.1 (1962), as do the first
class city real estate tax, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15976 (1957), and the
fourth to eighth class county assessment law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 5453.201 (Supp. 1965). Excluded from the sales and use tax are transfers
of property to be used or consumed directly in the operations of manufacturing. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(n) (4) (c) (i) (1964). From 1841
until its repeal in 1944, the state mercantile license tax did not apply to
manufacturers. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2681 (1964).
9. Commonwealth v. Northern Elec. Power & Light Co., 145 Pa. 105,
120, 22 Atl. 839, 841 (1891).
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in defining "manufacturing" for the purpose of applying the exemption 0 because the term is not defined by most of these tax laws.
For this reason the Pennsylania courts have, in recent years,
limited themselves to Pennsylvania precedents when deciding cases
involving the manufacturing exemption.1 ' In Tetley, for example,
a Massachusetts case 12 with a nearly identical fact situation was
brought to the lower court's attention by the company. This authority was dismissed as "interesting and informative" but not per1 3

suasive.

In most situations in which the question arises whether or not
one is a manufacturer, the prior case law must be examined to

see whether the company meets the criteria of manufacturing as
laid down by the Pennsylvania courts during the past century.
This Note will examine the evolution of the definition of manufacturing as developed by the case law and analyze this common law
of the recent statutory definidefinition in light of the application
4
tion in the sales and use tax law.1
The capital stock-franchise tax law 15 will be used as representative of how the manufacturing exemption is applied. That statute, which was involved in Tetley Tea, contains no definition of
manufacture. The manufacturing exemption from the capital stock
and franchise taxes consists of exempting so much of the capital
stock of domestic and foreign corporations "organized for manufacturing . . . which is invested in and actually and exclusively em16
ployed in carrying on manufacturing . . . within the State."'
10. In Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180, 130 Atl. 405
(1925) (a capital stock tax case), it was said: "While it is true that the case
[Commonwealth v. Lowry-Rodgers Co., 279 Pa. 361, 123 Atl. 855 (1924)]
was one involving the application of the mercantile license tax law, nevertheless, the point for determination was whether the process in question
was manufacturing." at 182, 130 Atl. at 40. See Commonwealth v. H. J.
Williams Co., 78 Dauph. 377, 382 (C.P. Pa. 1962).
11. Commonwealth v. American Ice Co., 406 Pa. 322, 178 A.2d 768
(1962); General Foods Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 244, 118 A.2d 572 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Hardes Lumber Co., 77 Dauph. 353, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 657
(C.P. 1961).
12. Commissioner of Corps. v. Board of Assessors, 324 Mass. 24, 84
N.E.2d 531 (1949) (held production of tea bags was manufacturing). That
court recognized, however, that Pennsylvania courts apply a different standard. Assessors of Boston v. Commissioner of Corps., 324 Mass. 730, 749, 84
N.E.2d 129, 140 (1949).
13. Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Co., 84 Dauph. 312, 316, 38 Pa. D. &
C.2d 729, 734 (C.P. 1966), aff'd, 421 Pa. 614, 220 A.2d 832 (1966).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(c) (1964).
15. The capital tax is imposed on domestic corporations. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 1871(a) (Supp. 1965). It is to be noted that the statute has
been amended to include exemptions for processing and research and development, which include some of those activities which were formerly
classified as non-manufacturing. Consideration of these amendments is,
however, beyond the scope of this Note.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871 (Supp. 1965). The statute excludes
from the, exemption "companies engaged in the distilling of liquors and
such as enjoy and exercise the right of eminent domain."
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In order to qualify for exemption from the capital stock or

franchise tax a corporation must have the power to manufacture included in its charter. 17 The exemption is limited to the capital
stock which is "invested in and actually and exclusively employed
in carrying on manufacturing within the state. ' i s Since this is an
exemption from taxation the rule of strict statutory construction
applies. Exemptions from taxation will be strictly construed
against the taxpayer, 1 as opposed to the liberal construction of exclusionary provisions.2 ° Thus the burden is on the taxpayer to
show that the necessary conditions exist entitling it to the exemption.2 1 A corporation is not entitled to the exemption when it
merely supplies raw materials and pays another party to manufacture the products which it sells.2 2

When its manufacturing activi-

ties are merely incidental to its main business, the company is not
entitled to the exemption unless the capital for which the exemption is sought is actually engaged in manufacturing and the article
manufactured is sold as an article of commerce. 21 The taxpayer's
activities can be segregated into manufacturing
and non-manufac2 4
turing for purposes of assessing the tax.

17. Commonwealth v. Paul W. Bounds Co., 316 Pa. 29, 173 Atl. 633
(1934); cf. Commonwealth v. E. W. Twitchell, Inc., 80 Dauph. 267, 31 Pa.
D. & C.2d 226 (C.P. 1963). It is the main purpose expressed in the charter
which determines whether or not the corporation is organized for manufacturing, Commonwealth v. Paul W. Bounds Co., supra, and not whether
the corporation is in fact engaged in manufacturing. Commonwealth v.
Jeca Corp., 81 Dauph. 35, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 759 (C.P. 1963). The corporation
must be "organized for manufacturing purposes." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 1871 (Supp. 1965). However, the corporation does not have to be organized exclusively for manufacturing purposes.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871 (a) (Supp. 1965).
19. The Statutory Construction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 501-602,
558(5) (1952); Commonwealth v. Berlo Vending Co., 415 Pa. 101, 104, 202
A.2d 94, 96 (1964); Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co., 412 Pa. 132, 141-42,
194 A.2d 199, 204 (1963); Commonwealth v. Densten Felt & Hair Co., 304
Pa. 536, 537, 156 Atl. 164, 165 (1931); Commonwealth v. Wark Co., 301 Pa.
150, 153, 151 Atl. 786, 787 (1930); Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Co.,
284 Pa. 180, 183, 130 At]. 405, 406 (1925); Callery's Appeal, 272 Pa. 255,
272, 116 Atl. 222, 228 (1922); Commonwealth v. Lackawanna Iron & Coal
Co., 129 Pa. 346, 356, 18 Atl. 133, 134 (1889); Commonwealth v. LowryRodgers Co., 279 Pa. 361, 366, 123 Atl. 855, 856 (1924) (dictum).
20. See Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co., 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 199
(1963). The court ruled that property involved directly in manufacturing
was excluded rather than exempted from the sales and use tax and therefore language in the statute was not subject to the rule of strict construction.
21. Commonwealth v. Williamsport Rail Co., 18 Dauph. 189, 190 (C.P.
1915), aff'd per curiam, 250 Pa. 596, 95 Atl. 795 (1915).
22. Ibid.
23. Commonwealth v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 412 Pa. 180, 183, 194
A.2d 191, 193 (1963); Commonwealth v. McCrady-Rodgers Co., 316 Pa. 155,
157, 174 Atl. 395, 396 (1935) (dictum).
24. Commonwealth v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., supra note 23, at 184,
194 A.2d at 194; Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A.2d 329
(1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 827 (1945), rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 890
(1945); Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 336 Pa. 209, 8 A.2d
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The basis for the present judicial definition of manufacturing
is found in Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth,25 decided in 1856. There
the court held that even though a producer of locomotives used
certain parts made by others, it was a manufacturer and thus exempt from the mercantile license tax. The court said manufacturing was "making" and did not necessarily require "the production
of a new article out of materials entirely raw; it generally consists
in giving new shapes, new qualities, or new combinations to mat2'6
ter which has already gone through some other artificial process."
The case is noteworthy in two respects. First, it sets forth the
proposition that even though parts of a taxpayer's product may be
manufactured and supplied by others, the taxpayer is not thereby
precluded from classification as a manufacturer. This proposition
has been followed consistently in subsequent cases.27 More important, however, Norris points out that newness is required in the
finished product. The taxpayer's operations must give the product
new characteristics such as new shapes, qualities or combinations.
This is the beginning of the concept of newness. Subsequent decisions have often applied this concept by focusing attention on the
finished product rather than on the activities necessary to produce
it.

28

"Newness," however, was not to be the exclusive test for manufacturing. In Commonwealth v. Keystone Bridge Co. 20 a corporation bought lumber, iron and steel in rough, unfinished form and
prepared beams, girders, rods and bolts which it then assembled
into bridges and other structures. It was held that this activity
was manufacturing because the company skillfully prepared the
parts from raw or unfinished material. The court pointed out that
the meaning of manufacture has "expanded with the advance of
the arts and sciences until it has come to mean ... the making of
anything by human art or skill. . . .""I From this case two new ele-

ments of the concept of manufacturing appear: (1) a product
fashioned from unfinished materials, (2) by human skill. In several subsequent cases courts using these concepts have held that
404 (1939); Hazen Eng'r Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 189 Pa. Super. 531, 151 A.2d
855 (1959).
25. 27 Pa. 494.
26. Id. at 496.
27. See, e.g., Koolvent Aluminum Awning Co. v. Pittsburgh, 186 Pa.
Super. 233, 142 A.2d 428 (1958).

28.

The court in the Tetley case practically ignored the company's

complex operations and based its decision on the characteristics of the final
product, comparing the tea bag with materials utilized to produce it. See
Commonwealth v. American Ice Co., 406 Pa. 322, 178 A.2d 768 (1962); Commonwealth v. Donovan Co., (No. 1), 76 Dauph. 191 (C.P. Pa. 1960).
29. 156 Pa. 500, 27 Atl. 1 (1893). The fact that the corporation as-

sembled what it had manufactured did not destroy the exemption, id. at

502-03, 27 Ati. at 2.
30. Id. at 503, 27 Atl. at 2; see Commonwealth v. Northern Elec. Light
& Power Co., 145 Pa. 105, 117, 22 Atl. 839, 840 (1891).
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building constructionl and assembly of pre-fabricated parts into a
finished product 32 are not manufacturing.
One of the few non-Pennsylvania cases cited by the Pennsylvania court when defining manufacturing is Hartranft v. Weigmann.3 3 In that case the plaintiff sought to recover a duty paid on
imported seashells. He contended that they were not manufactured
and thus not subject to the duty. The United States Supreme
Court held that the process of cleaning the shells with acid and
polishing them for sale as ornaments was not manufacturing. The
Court reasoned that they were still shells and were not changed
into a "new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use."34 This reasoning has been developed into what is
now the most important single test employed by the Pennsylvania
courts.3 5

To determine whether or not a corporation is engaged in

manufacturing, the courts inquire whether a new and different
30
product has emerged from the taxpayer's activities.
This new and different product test was a basis for holding
that breaking stone into different sizes by use of extensive machinery was not manufacturing.3 7 The utilization of elaborate machinery was not in itself sufficient to make the company's activities
manufacturing. There was no application of skill to change the
31. Commonwealth v. Wark Co., 301 Pa. 150, 151 Atl. 786 (1930);
Commonwealth v. Filbert Paving & Construction Co., 229 Pa. 231, 78 Atl.
104 (1910).
32. Philadelphia School Dist. v. Parent Metal Prods., Inc., 402 Pa. 361,
167 A.2d 257 (1960).
33. 121 U.S. 609 (1887).
34. Id. at 615. (Emphasis added.)
35. See Commonwealth v. Donovan Co. (No. 1), 76 Dauph. 191, 195-97
(C.P. Pa. 1960).
36. Some of the decisions employing the new and different product
test besides Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Co. are: Hartranft v. Wiegmann,
121 U.S. 609, 613 (1887); Philadelphia School Dist. v. Parent Metal Prods.,
Inc., 402 Pa. 361, 364, 167 A.2d 257, 258-59 (1961); Philadelphia School Dist.
v. Rosenberg, 402 Pa. 365, 368, 167 A.2d 259, 261 (1961); Pittsburgh v. Electric Welding Co., 394 Pa. 60, 64, 145 A.2d 528, 530 (1958); General Foods
Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 244, 251-52, 118 A.2d 572, 576 (1955); Armour &
Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 117, 69 A.2d 405, 409 (1949); Rieck-McJunkin
Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 362 Pa. 7, 22, 66 A.2d 295, 298 (1949);
Commonwealth v. Snyder's Bakery, 348 Pa. 308, 310, 35 A.2d 260, 261 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Peerless Paper Specialty, Inc., 344 Pa. 283, 285, 25 A.2d
323, 324 (1942); Commonwealth v. McCrady-Rodgers Co., 316 Pa. 155, 158,
174 Atl. 395, 396 (1934); Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. 447,
453, 141 Atl. 148, 150 (1928); Commonwealth v. Welsh Mt. Mining & Kaolin
Mfg. Co., 265 Pa. 380, 383, 108 Atl. 722, 723 (1919); Commonwealth v. John
T. Dyer Quarry Co., 250 Pa. 589, 594, 95 Atl. 797, 798 (1915); Edwin Bell
Cooperage Co. v. Pittsburgh, 177 Pa. Super. 567, 571-72, 112 A.2d 662, 663
(1955); Commonwealth v. H. J. Williams Co., 78 Dauph. 377, 382 (C.P. Pa.
1962); Commonwealth v. Hardes Lumber Corp., 77 Dauph. 353, 365, 27 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 657, 661 (C.P. 1961).
37. Commonwealth v. John T. Dyer Quarry Co., 250 Pa. 589, 95 Atl.
797 (1915); accord, Commonwealth v. Welsh Mt. Mining & Kaolin Mfg. Co.,
265 Pa. 380, 108 Atl. 722 (1919).
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stone's form or appearance other than size.
Lack of change in
the final product was the basis for the decision in the Tetley Tea
case. However, the stone-breaking case points out that the application of human skill remains an important factor to be considered
in these cases. It should not be overlooked when applying the new
and different product test.
The application of labor to materials is not in itself determinative of whether a corporation is manufacturing. In Commonwealth
v. Cover39 a corporation manufactured40 leather in another state,
brought it into Pennsylvania and cut it into pieces and strips according to the customer's order. The activity was held not to be
manufacturing because no completed article was made and the
leather was still leather when the taxpayer was finished with it.
The case is important for the dictum that "the mere application
of labor to materials is not always manufacturing .. ." The application of labor has subsequently been only a factor to be considered.
Activities which result in a chemical change are not in themselves enough to constitute manufacturing for tax exemption purposes. In Comnonwealth v. Lowry-Rodgers Co. 42 it was held that
roasting green coffee beans, which effected a chemical change in the
natural product, does not constitute manufacturing, "however skillful and beneficial the process and its result may be, even though
there occurs an incidental change in the size, form and weight of

that product.

... 43

In Lowry-Rodgers the court said that the definition of manufacture intended by the legislature is the same as its popular meaning, which is "to make or fabricate raw materials by hand, art or
machinery, and work [them] into forms convenient for use. ' 44 The
courts have, however, stressed that there must be a "change," while
38. See Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 69 A.2d 405 (1949);
Commonwealth v. Glendora Prods. Co., 297 Pa. 305, 146 Atl. 896 (1929);
Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180, 130 Atl. 405 (1925);
see also Commonwealth v. Welsh Mt. Mining & Koalin Mfg. Co., 21 Dauph.
116, 46 Pa. County Ct. 558 (C.P. 1918), aff'd per curiam, 265 Pa. 380, 108
Ati. 722 (1919); Commonwealth v. J. Frank Boyer Plumbing & Heating
Co., 23 Dauph. 296, 30 Pa. Dist. 275 (C.P. 1920).
39. 29 Pa. Super. 409 (1905), aff'd, 215 Pa. 556, 64 Atl. 686 (1906).
40. Tanning hides to produce leather is manufacturing. Commonwealth v. Elk Tanning Co., 1 Dauph. 96 n., 41 Pa. County Ct. 310 (C.P.
1897).
41. 29 Pa. Super. at 414: see Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609
(1887); Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180, 130 Atl. 405
(1925); Commonwealth v. Densten Felt & Hair Co., 304 Pa. 536, 156 Atl. 164
(1931); Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Wood Co., 36 Dauph. 257 (C.P. Pa.
1932).
42. 279 Pa. 361, 123 Atl. 855 (1924); accord, Commonwealth v. Glendora Prods. Co., 31 Dauph. 393 (C.P. 1928), aff'd per curiam, 297 Pa. 305,
146 Atl. 896 (1929).
43. Id. at 368, 123 Atl. at 857.
44. Id. at 365, 123 Atl. at 856. This is the definition contained in 2
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 2086 (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914).
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the typical dictionary definition4 5 makes no such emphasis. It is
surprising that in the manufacturing cases Pennsylvania courts
have not referred to the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction. 46 Statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular
sense.4 7 The courts continue to say that the popular definition is intended when actually their judicial definition is less inclusive.
Whether a company is a manufacturer is a question often arising where the company is a producer of food products. 4
Representative of such food product cases is Commonwealth v. Weiland
Packing Co. 4 9 It was held that curing, packing and selling smoked
hams, bacon, pickled meat and hides was not manufacturing. The
decision looked to the end result of the company's activities rather
than the nature of the activities themselves. The court said:
[T]he process of manufacture brings about the production
of some new article by the application of skill and labor to
the original substance or material out of which such new
product emerges. If, however, there is merely a superficial
change in the original materials or substances and no substantial and well signalized transformation in form, qualities and adaptability in use, quite different from the originals, it cannot properly and with reason be held that a
new article or object has emerged,-a new production has
been created.50
The products were not manufactured because there was a lack of
transformation; the final products were substantially the same as
the original, and any changes were incidental. The court pointed
out that a manufactured product must be a new and different production, adapted to uses and purposes different from the original
before the alterations were made, 1
Twenty years later, the same result was reached on similar
facts. 5 2 The court reasoned that there was no appreciable change in
size, form, texture, substance or composition. The decision held
that where there is merely a superficial change in the original materials, it is of no legal significance that the taxpayer employed
large plants, machinery and skilled labor; these factors would not
45. E.g., WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1963),
defines "manufacture" as, to make into a product suitable for use; to make
from raw materials by hand or machinery; to produce according to an
organized plan and with a division of labor, id. at 1378. This "popular"
definition is much broader than that used by the Pennsylvania courts.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 533 (1952).
47. See, e.g., Vitolins Unemployment Compensation Case, 203 Pa.
Super. 183, 199 A.2d 474 (1964).
48. In most of these cases the courts emphasize the original state of
the article rather than the production process.
49. 292 Pa. 447, 141 Atl. 148 (1925).
50. Id. at 450-51, 141 Atl. 149.
51. Id. at 453, 141 Atl. at 150.
52. Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 69 A.2d 405 (1949).
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change a processing operation into manufacturing.53 Similarly,
preparing and bottling soft drinks was not manufacturing. 4 The
company purchased syrup from another company, added water and
carbon dioxide gas and bottled the sodas by means of intricate machinery. The court was unimpressed by the use of scientific methods and elaborate machinery and the taxpayer's argument that a
material not fit for use (syrup) was fashioned into something
usable. 55 It was pointed out that the same result could be accomplished at a soda fountain, which, of course, would not be manufacturing in the popular sense of the word. 56
The results of these particular cases have, however, been
changed by statute. Preparation of meat products for sale or
wholesale distribution and bottling non-intoxicating beverages are
included in recently-enacted processing exemptions to several tax
statutes. 57
"Processing," unlike "manufacturing," is specifically
defined by the statutes and is limited to specifically enumerated
activities.58
In some food product cases some fine distinctions have been
drawn between manufactured and non-manufactured products. For
example, in one case the court held that ice cream, cottage cheese
and butter are manufactured products since they are new and different articles, unlike the original milk.59 In the same case, however, skim milk powder, buttermilk and sour cream were held to
be nonmanufactured articles. In the latter products the attributes
of milk might have been changed, but there was no new and different article.6 0 The distinction between the products is best illustrated by observing that the non-manufactured products are sold
as milk beverages like the original milk. In a similar case the
court held that decaffeinated and instant coffee, tapioca, and certain canned products are not manufactured. 6 1 These products went
through no substantial transformation in 2 form, qualities, and adap6
tability in use from the original material.
The distinction between manufactured and non-manufactured
food products rests on the new and different product test. If the
53. Id. at 116, 69 A.2d at 408; cf. Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 362 Pa. 13, 23, 66 A.2d 295, 299 (1949).
54. Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 33 Dauph.
421, 15 Pa. D. & C.254 (C.P. 1930).
55. Id. at 424; see also Commonwealth v. John T. Dyer Quarry Co.,
250 Pa. 589, 95 Atl. 797 (1915).
56. See Commonwealth v. Paul W. Bounds Co., 316 Pa. 29, 35-36,
173 Atl. 633, 634 (1934).
57. E.g., the capital stock-franchise tax law. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 1871 (c) (7),(8) (Supp. 1965).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871(c) (Supp. 1965).
59. Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co. v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 362 Pa. 7,
66 A.2d 295 (1949).
60. Id. at 23, 66 A.2d at 299.
61. General Foods Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 244, 118 A.2d 572 (1955).
62. Id. at 251, 118 A.2d at 576.
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original article is transformed into something with a distinctive
character, it is manufactured.3 It appears in the final analysis,
that in order to be considered manufactured, a food product must
have a use different from the original article.
In applying the new and different product test the courts require more than a mere "superficial change. 6 4 Total change, however, is not necessary. For example, it has been held that making
specially ordered cemetery monuments out of rough granite is manufacturing although the final product is stone. 65 Similarly, in a
well-reasoned decision, the court held that oil refining is manufacturing."6 It was noted that oil refining is commonly assumed
to be manufacturing. To require that a change take place in the
basic structure of the raw material would preclude practically all
operations from classification as manufacturing. 6
The court
adopted a common sense approach to the problem and said:
Our only concern here is whether or not the legislature
intended to exclude oil refining from these taxes. The purpose of the exclusion is an economic one in that it provides
that Pennsylvania manufacturers should not be burdened
with an additional tax on their products since such products
have to compete with products over other states in an open
market. . . . Common usage and customs plus the reason
for the exemption leads us to the only logical conclusion
that "manufacturing" includes "refining" as contemplated
by the legislature .... 68
In cases where a corporation assembles materials into a final
structure or product, the question of whether it is a manufacturer
seems to depend on whether the producer buys or makes the parts
which it assembles. 69 If it makes its own parts out of rough ma63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder's Bakery, 348 Pa. 308, 35 A.2d
260 (1944) (potato chips); Commonwealth v. J. Frank & Sons, Inc., 43 Dauph.
51 (C.P. Pa. 1937) (flavoring extract); Commonwealth v. P. Duff & Sons,
Inc., 36 Dauph. 1 (C.P. Pa. 1932) (peanut butter); Commonwealth v. Colbum Co., 1 Dauph. 96 n. (C.P. Pa. 1892) (mustard, spices, condiments).
64. Pittsburgh v. Electric Welding Co., 394 Pa. 60, 64, 145 A.2d 528,
530 (1958); Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. 447, 450, 141
Atl. 148, 149 (1929).
65. Horigan v. Pittsburgh, 178 Pa. Super. 558, 116 A.2d 228 (1955).
The court refused to follow a dictum to the contrary in Commonwealth v.
Paul W. Bounds, 316 Pa. 29, 32, 173 Atl. 633, 634 (1934). Compare Commonwealth v. East Bangor Consol. Slate Co., 162 Pa. 599, 600, 29 Atl. 706,
707 (1894).
66. Atlantic Ref. Co. Case, 398 Pa. 30, 156 A.2d 855 (1959).
67. Id. at 34-35, 156 A.2d at 857.
68. Id. at 35, 156 A.2d at 857-58.
69. Compare Philadelphia School Dist. v. Parent Metal Prods. Inc.,
402 Pa. 354, 167 A.2d 257 (1960), with Commonwealth v. Keystone Bridge
Co., 156 Pa. 500, 27 Atl. 1 (1893); Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co.,
156 Pa. 507, 27 Atl. 4 (1893) (companion case); but see Edwin Bell Cooperage Co. v. Pittsburgh, 177 Pa. Super. 567, 112 A.2d 662 (1955), wherein a
company making barrels with parts obtained elsewhere was found to be a
manufacturer on the premise that a new product was made out of existing
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terial, the producer is a manufacturer. 0 In Philadelphia School
District v. Rosenberg,i1 however, the taxpayer was held to be a
manufacturer although it did not technically meet this test. In that
case the corporation bought the materials from another and had
the pieces of cloth sewn together by another. The taxpayer designed the patterns, cut the cloth, assembled the pieces and designed the sizes and models. Again it was stressed that the popular understanding of manufacture was the one intended by the
legislature. The court dismissed as not determinative the fact that
the goods were sewn together by others. In noting that more than
one person or corporation can be involved in the manufacture of a
single article,7 2 the court said:
Rosenberg did more than arrange and assemble the
materials-he uses skill and ingenuity . . [and] molds the
original materials into a new product substantially
different
73
in form, quality and adaptability for use.
It appears that the deciding factor in Rosenberg was the application of art or unusual skill to what otherwise seemed like a cutting7 4 and assembly 75 function. 76 The application of skill or science
was also a major factor in the court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Berlo Vending Co.77 There the court held that the large scale
production and packaging of popcorn without the application of
any skill was not manufacturing. In an earlier case, the preparation of potato chips from raw potatoes was held to be manufacturing. Thus in Commonwealth v. Snyder's Bakery78 the court found
that the potato chip has a use, form and content entirely different
from the original potato although it remains essentially a potato
product. Such change was brought about through the application
of skill and labor which resulted in a "new and useful product."
When production of popcorn was compared with potato chip production, the court in the Berlo case pointed out that in popcorn
making there were much less control factors, science and skill,7 9
materials. Cf. Commonwealth v. Peerless Paper Specialty, Inc., 344 Pa.
283, 25 A.2d 323 (1942).
70. Commonwealth v. Keystone Bridge Co., supra note 69.
71. 402 Pa. 365, 167 A.2d 259 (1961).
72. See Hazen Eng'r Co. v. Pittsburgh, 189 Pa. Super. 531, 151 A.2d 855
(1959); Koolvent Aluminum Awning Co. v. Pittsburgh, 186 Pa. Super. 233,
243, 142 A.2d 428, 433 (1958) (by implication).
73. Philadelphia School Dist. v. Rosenberg, 402 Pa. 365, 368, 167 A.2d
259, 260-61 (1961).
74. Commonwealth v. Cover, 29 Pa. Super. 406 (1905) (cutting leather
not manufacturing).
75. Philadelphia School Dist. v. Parent Metal Prods. Inc., 402 Pa. 354,
167 A.2d 257 (1960) (assembling shop equipment not manufacturing).
76. See Titzel Eng'r, Inc. Mercantile Tax Case, 204 Pa. Super. 457,
205 A.2d 700 (1964), wherein the application of unusual skill was an important factor.
77. 415 Pa. 101, 202 A.2d 94 (1964).
78. 348 Pa. 308, 35 A.2d 260 (1944).
79. Commonwealth v. Berlo Vending Co., 415 Pa. 101, 106, 202 Atl.2d
94, 97 (1964).
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and that the change from the original kernel was merely superficial.80 There appears to be an extremely fine line drawn between
manufacturing and non-manufacturing in these two cases. Indeed, the lower court in Berlo expressed doubt as to the present
validity of the potato chip case.8' One possible explanation for the
seemingly diverse results is that in the Snyder's Bakery case the
court emphasized the changes in the final product. In Berlo the
court stressed the lack of art or science in the taxpayer's activities.
The same result might have been reached in both cases if the court
had emphasized the same thing in each case.
The courts are faced with the same problems of definition in
areas of production other than food processing. Commonwealth v.
American Ice Co. s2 held that making ice artificially for commercial
purposes was not manufacturing. The majority of the court were
of the opinion that no new product emerged. They relied upon a
case holding that distilling water was not manufacturing s 3 and
upon a secondary holding in another case8 4 that artificial ice production was not manufacturing. The court used the dubious analogy that ice was merely a form of water which would revert back to
its original form if allowed to remain in a warm temperature,
whereas a definitely manufactured item such as a chair, could never
revert back into a tree. Although the result was probably correct, it
might have been more appropriate to compare the ice with ice
cream, a manufactured product, which would not return to ordinary cream or milk when it melted.
The dissent in the American Ice case contended that ice was
sufficiently different from water and that the majority lost sight
of the complicated technical operations and apparatus which were
required. It is interesting that the court placed no weight upon
the fact that this particular corporation had enjoyed the manufacturing exemption prior to its 1935 repeal under the old capital
stock tax law; the case arose under the present franchise tax law
80. The court said:
There is no application of labor, skill, art or science to provide a
well signalized change as those terms are known. There can be
little doubt that the courts have required a certain degree of skill,
art or science to be employed.
Id. at 105, 202 A.2d at 96; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wark Co., 301 Pa. 150,
151 Atl. 786 (1930); compare Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 33 Dauph. 421, 15 Pa. D. & C. 254 (C.P. 1930).
° 81. Commonwealth v. Berlo Vending Co., 80 Dauph. 391, 397 (C.P.
1963), aff'd, 415 Pa. 101, 202 A.2d 94 (1964).
82. 406 Pa. 322, 178 A.2d 768 (1962).
83. Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Co., 284 Pa. 180, 130 Atl. 405
(1925).
84. Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 69 A.2d 405 (1949), held
that production of artificial ice was not manufacturing, relying on the
Sunbeam Water Co. case. However, the main issue in that case was whether
the cutting, curing and packing of meat was manufacturing. The majority
in the American Ice case also cited Commonwealth v. Northern Elec. Light
& Power Co., 145 Pa. 105, 22 Atl. 839 (1891), wherein the question involved the production of electricity.
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which had reinstated the exemption. 85
It is suggested that in applying the "new and different product"
standard to comparisons of the original material with the resulting product, the courts should apply additional criteria in explaining their decisions in order that prior cases may be reconciled with
the decision. This is important because, in the absence of a statutory definition, the case law must be examined. Although the new
and different product standard is certainly of primary importance,
the courts should further examine the operations necessary to produce the product. Was there the application of labor and skill?
What precise operations and facilities were necessary to bring about
the change? Was the activity merely a catalyst which set in motion
natural forces causing change? s6 The answers to these questions
should be considered along with the purpose behind the manufacturing exemption, for many corporations are doing the very things
which the legislature sought to encourage, i.e., providing a labor
market, producing staples of commerce, and developing Pennsylvania's natural resources.
In view of the diverse and sometimes seemingly inconsistent
results in the cases, the legislature might solve the problem by
expressly defining "manufacture" in a statutory amendment to the
capital stock-franchise tax act.87 This was done in the 1956 Selective Sales and Use Tax Act 8 8 wherein it is provided:
The performance of manufacturing,
(c) "Manufacture."
fabricating, compounding processing or other operations, engaged in as a business, which place any personal property in a form, composition or character different from that in which it is acquired whether for
sale or use by the manufacturer. .... 89
85. The manufacturing exemption from the capital stock and franchise
taxes dates back to 1885, Act of June 30, P.L. 193. The Acts of June 1, 1889,
P.L. 420 and June 8, 1891, P.L. 229, as amended, are the basis for the
present law. The exemption was withdrawn for the period from 1935 to
1958. The Act of May 16, 1935, P.L. 184, suspended the exemption of both
foreign and domestic manufacturing corporations for a two year period. At
the end of this period, the exemption was repealed, but was revived by the
Act of May 27, 1943, P.L. 762. It was successively postponed, however,
until 1958. The exemption has been in effect since 1958 and has been
amended to include processing by the Act of August 23, 1961, P.L. 1100, and
research and development by the Act of August 13, 1963, No. 397. See 1
5-003.
TAX REP.
CCH86.
PA. See,
e.g., Gaspari
v. Muhlenberg Twp. Bd. 392 Pa. 7, 139 A.2d
544 (1958). This case held that one who made a compost in which to grow
mushrooms was not a manufacturer since part of the change resulted
from natural decomposition. This was a zoning rather than a tax case, but
the court apparently applied the tax definition of manufacture.
87. In amending the statute to provide for processing and research
and development exemptions, the legislature went to great lengths to spell
them out. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871 (c), (c.1) (Supp. 1965).
88. PA. STAT. Amn. tit. 72, § 3403-2(c) (1964). This is now titled the
"Tax Act of 1963 for Education."
89. The Department of Revenue issued a regulation under the selective
sales and use tax act which defines manufacturing as follows:
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The courts have not had difficulty with the terms "fabricating"
and "compounding," and those activities which constitute processing are specificially defined in the statute."' "Fabricating" and
"compounding" have been treated as activities which are included
in "manufacturing," since all three terms refer to making something.91 The question quickly arose, however, whether this legislative definition of manufacture was merely an expression of the
judicial definition developed under prior statutes during the past
century, or whether it was broader and included activities not previously classified as manufacturing.92 The supreme court overruled
several lower court cases and held that the legislative definition
was not a mere restatement of the common law definition in Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co.98
a. Manufacturing.

"Manufacturing" is the performance as a

business of an integrated sense of operations which places personal
property in a form, composition, or character different from that in
which it was acquired ....

The change in form, composition or

character must be a substantial change, and it must result in a
transformation of property into a different product having a distinctive name, character and use. Operations such as compounding,
fabricating,or processing are illustrative of the types of operation
which may result in such a change although any operation which
has such a result may be manufacturing.
Mere changes in chemical composition or slight changes in

physical properties are not sufficient. For example, the C. Company, as its business operation takes coffee beans, and thereafter,
by mechanical and hand labor, cleans them, removes the outer
skins and roasts the beans. The roasted coffee, resulting from the
C. Company's activities, is not a manufactured product, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a change in the color, weight
and size of the bean.
A "manufactured product," further, is substantially different
from component materials used. For example, the D Company,
as its business operation, takes lumber, metal rods and bars, leather,
cloth, paint and nails, with which by means of hand and machine
tools, it fashions furniture. Chairs and tables so made by the D
Company are manufactured products, and the cutting, forming, and
painting operations which D Company performs are all manufacturing operations. However, if D's business was limited to the
mere cutting of materials, or the mere painting of desks, D would
not be manufacturer because the performance of those operations
alone does not transform the property into a substantially different
product.
A taxpayer claiming the manufacturer's exemption need not
start from the basic elements, so longas [a] substantially different
product is made. For example, the E -Company, as its business
operation, purchases glue and paper, and by the use of machinery
and labor, makes sealing tape. Notwithstanding the fact that the
paper, one of the basic ingredients, is a manufactured product itself, the sealing tape made by the E Company is a manufactured
product.
CCH PENNSYLVANIA SALES & USE TAx REGULATIONS & RuLINGs, Reg. 225
(1965). (Emphasis added.)
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2 (c.1) (1964).
91. Commonwealth v. Donovan Co. (No. 1), 76 Dauph. 191, 194-95
(C.P. Pa. 1960); Commonwealth v. Erie Plating Co., 76 Dauph. 316, 321, 324
(C.P. Pa. 1961).
92. See Debate, Selective Sales and Use Tax Act: The Manufacturing
Exemption, 64 DIcK. L. REV. 383 (1960).
93. 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 199 (1963).
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In Commonwealth v. Erie Plating Co.,94 the company was engaged in electroplating articles belonging to others for the purpose of providing a wear-resisting surface. The Commonwealth
Court held that the company was not entitled to the manufacturer's
exemption from the sales and use tax. The court concluded that
by defining "manufacture" in the statute, the legislature endeavored to follow the decisional law. Thus the end result of an activity
must be a new and different product in order to be "manufac9
tured." 95 The same court in Commonwealth v. Donovan Co., 6
held that the process of hardening metal dies belonging to others
by heat treating was not manufacturing under the same statute.
The operation was not manufacturing because no new and different product emerged from the company's activities. The basis of
the decision was that the statutory definition of manufacturing in
the sales and use tax act had the same meaning as the judicial definition developed under the capital stock tax and mercantile license
tax cases.9 7 The court commented:
[T]here is little doubt that the legislature in adopting the
definition of manufacturing in the Selective Sales and Use
Tax Act intended only to describe the process of manufacturing and not to enlarge it beyond the definition that had
been developed by over 100 years of careful judicial review. 98
However, the problem was solved for these two corporations by
the legislature since both heat treating and electroplating metal are
now specificially included in the legislative definition of "processing" in both the sales and use tax law and the capital stock-franchise tax law." Thus the companies are entitled to the processing
exemption from these two taxes.
Three years later in 1963, the supreme court in Commonwealth
1°
0
v. Sitkin's Junk Co.,
disapproved the Donovan rationale and
stated that the court should have applied the definition provided
by the legislature and not substituted the judicial definitions under prior tax statutes. 10 ' The intent of the legislature in specifically defining manufacturing was explained by the court:
By specifically defining "manufacture," the legislature indicated its intent that "manufacture" be construed in accordance with the statutory language and that the construction of such word was not to be controlled by prior judicial
construction of such word under prior tax statutes. By way
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

76 Dauph. 316 (C.P. Pa. 1961).
Id. at 324.
(No. 1), 76 Dauph. 191 (C.P. Pa. 1960).
Id.at 193-94.
Id. at 198.
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871(c) (3) (Supp.1965) (capital stock-franchise tax); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403-2(c.1) (3) (1964) (sales and use tax).
100. 412 Pa. 132, 194 A.2d 199 (1963).
101. Id. at 137, 194 A.2d at 202.
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of example, the act provides that the finished product be
"different" from that form in which it was acquired whereas under prior judicial construction
' 02 the finished product
had to be both "new and different.'
In Sitkins Junk the court held that sorting, cutting and bailing metallic scrap by means of various machinery was manufacturing for purposes of the sales and use tax despite the fact that the
taxpayer started and finished with scrap. 10 3 Under the sales and
use tax statute the final product need only be different from the
original-here a different "form, composition and character" of
scrap-rather than be new and different as required by the judicial
definition of manufacture. The court went further and said that
the "manufacturing exemption" is actually not an exemption but
an exclusion. Thus under the Sales and Use Tax law the term
"manufacturing" is not subject to the rule of strict construction,' 0 4
because a manufacturer under the statute does not come within
the general language of the taxing statute. 10 5 It seems obvious
that under the sales and use tax definition set forth by the Sitkin's
Junk case, Tetley Tea Company would be a manufacturer since it
began with paper and loose tea and produced through its operations a tea bag, a product different in form and character, if not in
composition. However, the sales and use tax definition has been
ignored in subsequent cases arising under statutes not specifically
defining manufacturing. 10' It has even been specifically rejected
by one decision. 10'
In a case 0 s dealing with a mercantile license tax, the company's operations were analogous to Sitkin's Junk Co.'s operations.
It purchased steel rods of various sizes, cut and twisted them into
desired lengths and shapes; it also purchased coils of steel rods
which it straightened and recoiled to a desired diameter and pitch,
and then sold these products to construction contractors to be used
as the bases for concrete reinforcing bars and columns. The court
held that such activities did not constitute manufacturing under
prior judicial definitions since there was no "well signalized or sub102. Id. at 138, 194 A.2d at 202.
103. But see Richman Sons, Inc. v. School Dist., 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 670
(C.P. 1954) (judicial definition used for general business tax).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558(5) (1952).
105. 412 Pa. at 141-42, 194 A.2d at 204.
106. Commonwealth v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 412 Pa. 180, 194 A.2d
191 (1963) (franchise tax case decided same day as Sitkin's Junk case);
Commonwealth v. Berlo Vending Co., 415 Pa. 101, 202 A.2d 94 (1964) (franchise tax); Directory Publishing Co. v. Pittsburgh, 205 Pa. Super. 423, 211
A.2d 509 (1965) (mercantile tax); School Dist. v. American Leonic Mfg. Co.,
205 Pa. Super. 243, 209 A.2d 5 (1965) (general business tax); Titzel Eng'r,
Inc. Mercantile Tax Case, 204 Pa. Super. 457, 205 A.2d 700 (1964) (mercantile
tax).
107. Directory Publishing Co. v. Pittsburgh, supra note 106, at 428-29,
211 A.2d at 512.
108. Pittsburgh v. Electric Welding Co., 394 Pa. 60, 145 A.2d 528 (1958).
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stantial transformation in the form or quality of the steel materials" and any changes made were "purely superficial." If the
Sitkin's Junk case's standard were applied here the activity would
probably have been classified as manufacturing.
It appears that because the statutory definition of manufacture in the sales and use tax act has been interpreted as being
more inclusive than the common law definition under the prior
taxing statutes, Pennsylvania now has two separate standards for
determining whether or not one is a manufacturer. It is submitted
that this is undesirable in light of the purpose behind the exemption-to encourage manufacturing in this state. 10 9
Most of Pennsylvania's tax statutes containing the exemption
are without a statutory definition of manufacturing. Therefore a
review of past decisions assembling the elements of what will be
considered manufacturing at the present time remains necessary. 110
Basically a new product must be made out of existing material."'
The emphasis is usually placed on the materials involved, what is
done to those materials and the resulting product. Thus one is not
a manufacturer merely by virtue of his efficient and modern operations. Summarizing the results from the cases it can be said that
109. In Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case, 405 Pa. 421, 175 A.2d
856 (1961), the court said: "Today most states and communities in this
country are engaged in a fight to encourage new industry to move into
that state or community and to retain the industries they already have .. "
Id. at 429, 175 A.2d at 860. Thus, it appears that the policy behind the
exemption is valid today.

110. The Department of Revenue furnishes instructions to aid taxpayors

in determining whether they are eligible to claim the manufacturing exemption:
What Constitutes Manufacturing
Determination of what constitutes manufacturing is based on
judicial decisions and administrative interpretations. Decided cases
relating to the Capital Stock Manufacturing Exemption provision
as constituted prior and subsequent to 1935 and decisions interpreting the various mercantile taxes, have ruled that the following
elements are involved in manufacturing:
(1) The application of labor, skill, art or science;
(2) Changes or modification in existing material effected by
a process popularly regarded as manufacturing;
(3) The evolvement of new forms, qualities, properties, combinations or adaptability to certain uses; and
(4) The production of a different material with a new use,
capable of, or adapted to, the satisfaction of some want or desire
of man.
A mere superficial rather than a substantial change in the
original material with respect to its form, quality and adaptability
to use does not constitute manufacturing. The Courts have held
that certain operations are not manufacturing even though the
capital stock of corporations has been invested in large plants and
intricate and expensive machinery which require trained and
skilled men for the operation thereof.
See 1 CCH PA. TAX REP. T 5-251.15.

111. Commonwealth v. Peerless Paper Specialty, Inc., 344 Pa. 283, 285,
25 A.2d 323, 324 (1942).
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"manufacturing" produces a new, different and useful article 12 by
the application of labor and skill" 3 to materials not necessarily
entirely raw. 11 4 A manufactured product will be substantially
transformed in form, qualities and adaptability in use from the original materials. 15 Whatever the article and activity in question it
must be popularly regarded as manufacturing."" In order to be
manufacturing activities, they must be such as are properly thought
of as manufacturing"' and the term "manufacturing" will be given
its ordinary and general meaning,"18 as used in the popular sense." 9
For example, the construction of highways or buildings 20 would
not be manufacturing in its ordinary and general sense while the
production of articles
of commerce would be manufacturing in the
2
popular sense.' '
22
Apparently the decision in Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Co.'
is based on the premise that the company started and ended with
tea. 128

Thus there was no substantial transformation in form,

quality and use2 4-no new and different product. The majority
opinion, however, appears to have overlooked the fact that Tetley
began with not only tea, but special paper as well. When combined
by machine the result was not tea but a tea bag. The majority
stated that merely because tea in a bag was more convenient and
appealing
does not make the production of tea bags manufactur12 5
ing.
The dissenting opinion cited a series of tests to be applied in
determining whether an activity constitutes manufacturing. 26
Among these tests are whether a large capital investment is required and whether the new product sells at a higher price than its
components sold separately. There is no case resting its decision on

112. Commonwealth v. McCrady-Rodgers Co., 316 Pa. 155, 174 Aft. 395
(1934).
113. Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing Co., 292 Pa. 447, 141 Atl. 148
(1928).
114. Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. 494 (1856).
115. General Foods Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 244, 118 A.2d 572 (1955).
116. Mt. Vernon Corp. v. Revenue Comm'r, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 479, 481-82
(C.P. 1957).
117. Commonwealth v. Berlo Vending Co., 415 Pa. 101, 202 A.2d 94
(1964).
118. Philadelphia School Dist. v. Parent Metal Prods. Inc., 402 Pa. 361,
167 A.2d 257 (1960).
119. Philadelphia School Dist. v. Rosenberg, 402 Pa. 365, 167 A.2d 259
(1961).
120. Commonwealth v. Wark Co., 301 Pa. 150, 151 Atl. 786 (1930).
121. See Commonwealth v. H. J. Williams Co., 78 Dauph. 372, 382
(C.P. Pa. 1962).
122. 421 Pa. 614, 220 A.2d 832 (1966).
123. This was the basis for the Commonwealth's argument. See Brief
for Appellee, p. 13.
124. General Foods Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 244, 118 A.2d 572 (1955).
125. 421 Pa. at 617, 220 A.2d at 634.
126. Id. at 618, 220 A.2d at 634. These were taken from Appellant's
Brief, pp. 17, 18.
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either of these factors. At most, a large capital investment (in the
form of elaborate machinery) has merely been a circumstance to
be considered along with other factors. The selling price of the
new product as compared with its components has never appeared
to be a determining factor in any Pennsylvania case.
Perhaps a different result could have been reached in Tetley
12 7
if a dictum in Commonwealth v. Peerless Paper Specialty, Inc.
had been given greater attention. In that case the court said: "It
would be just as erroneous to say that a maker of sealing tape is not
a manufacturer as to say that makers of envelopes, paper cups, fly
paper, etc., were not."12 In that case the court held that a company taking paper and glue and converting them into sealing tape
with advertisements stamped on it was a manufacturer because a
new and different product resulted which had totally different
uses. In Tetley the company took paper and tea and made a tea
bag, which appears to involve as much transformation as occurs in
making an envelope or cup out of paper.
CONCLUSION

The result in Tetley may be correct if tea bags are considered
to be food products. In the final analysis, food products must, in
order to be considered manufactured, have a different use from the
original materials. Using this reasoning, tea bags are not manufactured because they really do not have a use different from the
original product-loose tea. Both are used to make tea beverages.
The reasons given in Tetley, however, barely support the decision. This is true of many of the Pennsylvania decisions wherein
the courts undertake to determine whether or not an activity constitutes manufacturing.
Since case law is the basis for decision under the statutes which
do not define manufacturing, it is submitted that the common law
definition of manufacturing is satisfactory only where its elements
are fully applied in each case. The courts should make full use
of all the criteria available to them and explain their decisions
more fully.
WILLIAM T. DYER

127.
128.

344 Pa. 283, 25 A.2d 323 (1942).
Id. at 286, 25 A.2d at 324. (Emphasis added.)

